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Abstract
Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contri-
butions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge
on whether and how these limits achieve this goal. With a regression discontinuity
design that uses institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities,
we show that looser limits increase the number and value of public contracts assigned
to the winning candidate’s donors. The evidence suggests that this is explained by
looser limits concentrating influence over the elected candidate among top donors and
not by a reduction in electoral competition or changes in who runs for office. We
further show that looser limits worsen the performance of donor-managed contracts:
they are more likely to run over costs and require time extensions. Overall, this paper
demonstrates a direct link between campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and
worse government contract performance.
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Over 40% of countries around the world have already adopted laws limiting campaign
contributions as a way of curbing the influence of money in politics (IDEA 2014).1 On the
one hand, limits on political donations might prevent policies that favor moneyed interests
in the allocation of government resources. On the other hand, campaign contribution limits
can be considered as impediments to the free expression of preferences and obstacles to the
flow of information voters receive via reduced campaign spending.2 Despite the popularity
of campaign contribution limits, their widespread use, and reasonable arguments in favor
and against them, empirical assessments of their impacts, as well as an understanding of the
underlying mechanisms behind those effects, remains limited.
We study the effect of campaign contribution limits on donor behavior during the
2011 Colombian mayoral elections, the subsequent assignment of public contracts after the
elections, and importantly, the performance of those contracts. By tracing the impact of
the policy all the way to government contract performance we provide new evidence on how
campaign contribution limits could curb the influence of money in politics, leading to greater
government efficiency.
We first establish that a strong bias exists in public spending in favor of donors of the
winning candidate. Following Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson (2014), a close elections regres-
sion discontinuity approach shows that the winning candidate’s donor receives on average
3.3 contracts more than a donor of the runner up, a threefold increase in the average number
of contracts that donors of the two top candidates receive. When we focus on contracts that
are assigned under a contractual category that gives mayors more discretion in selecting
1See also Scarrow (2007) for a review on political finance across the world.
2See U.S. Supreme Court decision Citizens United vs Federal Elections Commission, 558
US 310 2010 for a discussion of how campaign contribution limits may inhibit the free of
speech.
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contract recipients and that have less oversight, the minimum value category,3 we find that
the mayor’s donors’ contracts are 28% larger in value than that of those managed by bare
loser campaign’s donors.
Next, we ask if campaign limits can curb the benefits received by the winning candi-
date’s donors. Studying this question empirically is challenging as campaign finance regula-
tions might be influenced by the public’s perceptions of corruption and the actual pressures
of private interests on policy makers. Moreover, it is difficult to account for all the historical,
cultural, and contextual factors that determine both restrictions on campaign finance and
corrupt behavior. We take advantage of the fact that in Colombia campaign contribution
limits in mayoral races vary according to arbitrary thresholds on the number of registered
voters. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that loosening restrictions on the
total amount of contributions to campaigns from 58 to 110 million pesos (17000 to 32000
U.S. dollars approx) leads to, on average, 3.3 more public contracts for a mayor’s donor.
Moreover, if the contracts given to these donors belong to the minimum value category, their
values are 66% larger in municipalities with less restrictive limits.
We proceed to explore the theoretical mechanisms behind why mayors’ donors are
favored to a larger extent in municipalities with looser campaign limits. We argue that less
restrictive limits increase the influence of wealthy donors on the elected official, because they
are able to contribute a larger share of total campaign revenues. If more campaign resources
come from particular donors, elected officials would feel more pressure to reciprocate these
contributions. Consistent with these ideas, we find that donations concentrate among top
donors under looser limits. A top donor contributes 13 percentage points more of the cam-
paign total revenue under looser limits than what a top donor gives under tight limits, while
the non-top donors donations are unaffected by limit changes.
3Contracts under the minimum value category are below 10% of the municipality budget,
can be advertised for only one day, and they are automatically assigned to the lowest bidder.
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We also test and rule out three alternative explanations for why the mayors’ donors
receive more benefits with looser contribution limits. The first is that higher limits make
elections less competitive (Stratmann, J and Aparicio-Castillo 2006), which reduces the
incumbent’s incentives to prioritize the general interest over her donors’. We do not find any
evidence that electoral competition differs by treatment. The second is that looser limits
could attract candidates who are prone to favor private interests. We show, however, that
elected mayors in municipalities with higher limits are not systematically different in terms
of their previous participation in political campaigns, experience in elected office, or history
of sanctions than those in municipalities with lower limits. Finally, we carry out a number
of checks that suggest our findings are not driven by more severe underreporting of donors
and donations in municipalities with more limited contributions.
The final analysis in the paper considers downstream impacts of looser campaign
limits on the quality of government functioning as measured by the performance of public
contracts assigned to donors. This is a key advance on existing work because it sheds light
on the efficiency loss versus information loss debate: On the one hand, favoring certain
donors outside of merit can negatively affect contract execution. On the other hand, fewer
restrictions could improve the flow of information via donations that helps voters to elect
those candidates who know how to best allocate public resources.4 Challenging the latter
view, we show that contracts given to donors in higher limit municipalities are 7.4 percentage
points more likely to run over costs, and that the increase in such over costs relative to the
4Coate (2004), for example, shows that policies can be closer to the median voter’s ideal
policy without restrictions on campaign contributions even with donors who favor extreme
policies. The trade-off between informational gains of campaign spending and costs asso-
ciated to private interests’ campaign financing is also formally studied by Prat (2002) and
Ashworth (2006). For models of contributors’ influence without a quid pro quo see Fox and
Rothenberg (2011) and Kenkel (2019).
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ones observed in low limit municipalities is a sizeable 92.3 percent.
The Colombian case is particularly well suited to study how campaign finance reg-
ulations affect donors’ influence over elected officials. Besides the fact that the exogenous
variation in limits created by the institutional rules help us to address clear identification
challenges, a national ID number allows us to link public contracts to individual donors-
recipients. This helps us to circumvent some empirical challenges faced by roll-call based
analyses that are common in the literature on the influence of money in politics. For exam-
ple, while in our case it is clear who the recipient of a contract is, legislative changes affect
a large group of beneficiaries making difficult to establish whether a legislator’s support for
such changes was aimed at benefiting her donors. Moreover, donors’ influence might manifest
at early but less observable stages of the legislative process (Powell 2012; Powell and Grim-
mer 2016); and voting on bills on industrial policy, regulation, or taxation at a federal level
is more ideologically charged than most municipality government purchases, which increases
the biases in roll-call analysis generated by shared ideologies between donors and candidates
(Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson 2014; Fox and Rothenberg 2011).
Our focus on private interests’ influence on local governments of a developing democ-
racy contributes more generally to a literature that, for the most part, has focused on national
legislation in industrialized settings (Anzia 2019). The Colombian mayoral race context dif-
fers significantly from the well studied federal legislative elections setting in the U.S. As
we will show below, in Colombia, donors to mayoral campaigns are typically local business
owners seeking to gain preferential treatment in public procurement assignment rather than
corporations wanting to influence legislation (Bonica 2014, 2016), or groups of individuals
contributing small amounts to express their political views (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo
and Snyder 2003). The party system is also highly fragmented and ideological polarization
and party identification are low. Given these characteristics, our findings are more directly
relevant to the developing democracies where limits on campaign contributions are being
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considered or are already in effect, and on whom existing evidence is particularly thin.
Our paper is related to a large, mostly US-focused, literature that estimates ef-
fects of contributions on legislators’ behavior. In a review of these studies Ansolabehere,
De Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) finds that this work is unable to clearly establish quid pro
quo exchanges between politicians and donors.5 More recent work that addresses some of
the methodological challenges in this literature has shown that donors target legislators who
are most useful to them in a matter consistent with access-seeking donations (Powell 2012;
Barber 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014; Powell and Grimmer 2016; Kalla and Broockman
2016; Li 2018) and to influence indirectly legislative procedure (Fouirnaies and Hall 2018).6
Particularly close to our work is Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson (2014) who find substantial
favoritism towards donors of federal deputies in the assignment of government contracts in
Brazil. Although our findings are consistent with donor money influencing elected officials,
our main contribution to this literature is to provide evidence of campaign contribution limits
curbing influence that is directly observed in the data.
A number of studies have also investigated the role of campaign finance regulations
as determinants of a several election related outcomes. This work has shown how restric-
tions on campaign contributions and spending impact electoral results and competitiveness
(Stratmann, J and Aparicio-Castillo 2006; Hall 2016; Avis et al. 2017; Fouirnaies 2018), po-
5Stratmann (2005) finds evidence of influence of money on legislators behavior in a meta
analysis using the same sample of papers, but he points out that methodological challenges
faced by the surveyed work do not allow definitive conclusions. Using better research designs,
Fowler, Garro and Spenkuch (2020) still do not find clear evidence of Quid Pro Quos when
focusing on U.S. senate races and corporate donations.
6There is also evidence supporting an investment rationality behind campaign contribu-
tions as opposed to consumption or expressive motivations (e.g. Gordon, Hafer and Landa
2007).
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larization (Barber 2015), party systems (Potter and Tavits 2015), political efficacy (Primo
and Milyo 2006), future career choices of legislators (Weschle 2019), interest groups elec-
tioneering activities (Hogan 2005), and rates of contesting (Hamm and Hogan 2008) and
reelection (La Raja and Schaffner 2014). A few papers have also explored the relationship
between campaign finance regulations and corruption. Baltrunaite (2019) investigates how
donors are advantaged in the bidding process of public contracts and estimates the effects
of a ban on corporate contributions on contract assignments in Lithuania. Fazekas and
Cingolani (2017) and Hummel, Gerring and Burt (2019) focus on how campaign finance
regulation and campaign state funding are linked to measures of corruption in comparative
cross-country analyses. Our RD design and the ability to directly link donors to contracts
allows us to estimate the causal effect of campaign finance regulation on the actual biases
favoring donors in contract assignment. Importantly, unlike previous work, we propose a
theoretical mechanism that accounts for the increased influence of particular donors when
the campaign limits are looser. We also assess alternative explanations, and evaluate the
effects of such restrictions on the quality of donor managed contracts.
Colombian Electoral Context and Campaign Financing
Institutions
Mayors in Colombia are powerful figures in their municipalities having discretion over an
average of 26% of all local spending.7 Because they are in charge of executing the munic-
ipality budget, they have plenty of opportunities to repay donors. Most public goods and
services in a municipality are provided through third parties who contract with the mu-
7Period 2004-2007. The discretionary resources mostly comes from property tax revenues.
Transfers from the central government tend to be tied to specific expenses.
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nicipal government. There are three types of contracts: open-bid contracts, contracts with
non-bid process and waivers, and minimum value contracts that cover those under 10% of
the municipality budget. The first category offers the most difficulty to a mayor who wants
to reciprocate a donor. This is because with open bid contracts there is a call for proposals
that is advertised online for 5 to 10 working days, and a committee needs to evaluate the
submissions. In the second category, the mayor must provide official justification for the
waivers and there is only a limited set of economic activities for which the category applies.8
In contrast, contracts given under the minimum value category only need to be advertised
for one day and are automatically given to the lowest bidder, which precludes a proposal
evaluation by a separate committee.
Uninformative party labels, frequent party switching by candidates, and the nature of
policy making at the local level all make it difficult for contributions in mayoral campaigns
to be driven by ideological or partisan considerations. At the municipality level, the nature
of policy-making limits the role of ideology during mayoral campaign races. Even at the
national level certain historical developments have maintained ideologically uninformative
party labels. The National Front is perhaps an early example of this: between 1958 to 1974
liberals and conservatives agreed to alternate the presidency. This agreement encouraged
intra-party competition and blurred the ideological differences between the dominant parties.
A permissive electoral system in the 1990s also contributed to the weakening of the party
system (Pacho´n and Shugart 2010; Shugart, Moreno and Fajardo 2007). Not surprisingly,
8The direct contract category applies to: 1. The acquisition or supply of goods and
services of uniform technical characteristics and common use by entities; 2. Contracting
in which the tender process has been declared abandoned; 3. Contracts for the provision
of health services; 4. Goods produced by or intended for agricultural purposes, offered on
legally constituted product exchanges; 5. The contracting of goods and services required for
defence and national security; and 6. Disposal of assets.
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only 25% of Colombians identified with a political party in 2011 (LAPOP 2011).
Mayors have incentives not to renege on agreements made with their donors. Although
mayors cannot be reelected in consecutive terms, most of them continue their career in
politics.9 Of all mayors in 1988, for example, 62% had participated in other elections after
their term ended. One reason to favor current donors therefore is to maintain a flow of
resources in future campaigns. Mayors can also ask for a slice of the contracts, called a
mordida (a bite). That is, the recipient of the contract has to give back a fraction of the
value of the contract to the politician as payment. A famous example among Colombians
is the one of former mayor of Bogota´ (the capital), Samuel Moreno, who was sentenced to
18 years in prison for receiving 2,790 millions of pesos—14 times his annual salary—from a
recipient of a contract assigned by the local government.
In line with the idea of non-ideological contributions, we see that most of the donors
who donate to several candidates do so to candidates of different parties (76.1%). However,
there are very few donors who donate to more than one candidate, only 138 out of 6658
donors. These donors do not appear to be citizens expressing their preferences with small
donations as in the U.S. case (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo and Snyder 2003), as 75.33% of
them give a contribution that is larger than the average monthly wage in the municipality.
The fact that the donors are not contributing to races outside the municipality, and are giving
large donations, is consistent with the general perception that donors to mayoral campaigns
are local business owners who could benefit from contracts with the local government.
Anecdotal evidence suggest that investing in a mayor’s campaign can be highly prof-
itable. For example, take the case of the mayor of Amalfi in 2011. One of his donors
contributed 3000 dollars to the mayor’s campaign, equivalent to 22% of the campaign rev-
enue. Later, during the mayor’s term, the donor signed 86 contracts with the municipality
worth more than half a million dollars. Of these contracts, only five were awarded via
9There is no limit on the number of times someone can be a mayor of a municipality.
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competitive tender. Such stories find some support in the data. The average donor in the
sample receives contracts that are 45 times larger than their contribution. Even if we focus
on minimum value contracts, the value of such contracts received by a donor is on average
8 times larger than their contribution. Below, we examine systematically whether donors of
the mayor campaign are being favored in contract assignment.
Colombian law establishes limits for total campaign contributions that are set equal
to a limit on campaign expenses. The National Electoral Commission sets the campaign lim-
its on the basis of the number of registered voters in the municipality.10 These limits jump
discontinuously at arbitrary cut-offs of registered voters in a municipality. For example, at
25,000 registered voters, the campaign contribution limit increases from 58 to 110 M COP.11
In addition, individual donors cannot give more than 10% of the total campaign contribution
limit.12 Campaign contribution limits are announced months before the candidate registra-
tion date and violations of these limits can be punished with removal from office, loss of state
funding, and dissolution of the political organization.13 Importantly for our research design,
the voter registration thresholds that determine the contribution limits do not impact other
policies. This allows us to avoid the estimation of a compounded treatment (Grembi et al.
2018).
10See National Electoral Commission Norm (Resolucio´n) 78 de 2011.
11Subsequently at 50,000 registered voters the limit jumps to 330M COP; at 100,000
registered voters the limit jumps to 659M COP; at 250,000 the limit jumps to 745M COP;
at 500,000 the limit jumps to 1,318M COP. For the capital city of Bogota´, the limit is 1,646M
COP.
12See Article 23 of Law 1475 of 2011.
13For more details see Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Law 1475 of 2011 and Acto Legislativo No,
01 de 2009.
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Data
We use electoral data compiled by Pacho´n and Sa´nchez (2014), gathered from the Colombian
national electoral authority, the Registradur´ıa Nacional del Estado Civil. These data contain
the results for the 2011 mayoral elections for all municipalities.
The campaign funding data is posted online by the National Electoral Commission
(Concejo Nacional Electoral). Electronic campaign finance reporting is mandatory by law
since 2009 to every candidate who runs for office.14 The National Electoral Commission
fines candidates or parties that do not comply with the reporting requirements. As a result
compliance is fairly high: out of 4,460 mayoral candidates in 2011, 89% reported campaign
information. In these data, we observe individual donations for each candidate.
We also compile detailed data on contracting from Datos Abiertos, an online por-
tal that was created to increase transparency in public procurement. The data contains the
universe of public procurement data including information on contracting in-charge, the con-
tractor (and their unique national ID), the contractual category, and the contract’s economic
sector, its value, purpose, and length. We also know whether the contract was completed,
and/or overran in terms of costs.
We match the unique ID of each donor to the ID of the contractors assigned in the
same municipality that the candidate ran in, which creates a direct link between the donor
and a beneficiary from government resources. In Colombia, two types of legal entities can
contract with the state: individuals and companies. When an individual gives a donation
and his/her company receives a contract, we can link them uniquely since the same number
is used for the person and their company. The only link that cannot be made is between
individuals and public companies or companies with multiple owners: it could be the case
that one of the owners gives a donation and then the company, which is identified with a
14Norm 1094 of 2009.
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different owner’s ID, receives the contract. Contracts assigned to multiple-owner companies,
however, represent only 9.9% of all contracts and are concentrated in large cities that are not
included in our sample because they are not close to the threshold used in our RD design.
In terms of politicians’ characteristics, we have access to the entire history of dis-
ciplinary sanctions for those who held elected office and whether candidates had illegally
registered to vote in the past.15 This last variable can serve as a proxy for non-elected
politicians’ proclivity for malfeasance. We also use have data on gender, age, and race.16
The Returns From Donating to a Winning Candidate
We begin our analysis by documenting that donors who contribute to winning candidates
get more contracts. This is consistent with mayors exerting favoritism towards their donors
in the assignment of public contracts.
The empirical exercise compares contracts received by donors of the winning candi-
date to contracts received by the donors of the runner up. A difficulty when interpreting
these comparisons is that winning candidates might differ from losing candidates in ways
that make them more likely to assign contracts to its donors. For example, winners might
have unobserved attributes that help them attract donations from many more individuals
15Disciplinary sanctions can happen for a variety of reasons, including not replying to a
formal information request by citizens, running for office without satisfying legal require-
ments, or violating contracting regulations. Illegal voting registration covers impersonating
a dead person’s vote, registering to vote in a municipality where she does not reside, or
voting while underage.
16The data comes from politicians’ pictures on the ballots and a facial detection algorithm.
Comparison of the self-reported gender to the predicted gender gave us an error of less than
3%, validating the algorithm results.
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increasing the likelihood that some of them end up receiving a contract from a municipality
by pure chance. Moreover, donors who are competitive in tendering processes because of
their business acumen, for example, might also be the best at identifying the most qualified
candidate. To circumvent these problems, we follow Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson (2014)
by using a close election regression discontinuity design that compares the contracts received
by donors of a candidate who barely wins with donors of the candidate who barely loses.17
The main identification assumption is that candidates who barely win the election are
similar in all characteristics that would affect contract assignment to those who barely lose.
Table A1 in Appendix B confirms that at least in terms of observables, these candidates
are similar. In particular, there are no significant differences in their political experience
(measured in the number of elections they have participated in), whether they have held
a mayoral office in the past, ideology, or campaign size. We also do not find significant
differences in the number of donors or the weight of donations in their campaign revenues.
This is important, as it is possible that even in narrow margins, winners could be attracting
more funds because they are perceived to be better able to allocate public resources.
In Table A2 in Appendix B, we also verify that donors of the bare winners and losers
are similar in a number of observable characteristics. We find no evidence of discontinuities
at the close elections margin on whether the donor is registered in the chamber of commerce
or is registered as a company. Donors of the bare winner are not significantly more likely
to be producers (as opposed to service providers), and, when they are companies, they have
similar ages of those donating to the bare loser.
17An alternative strategy would be to compare the benefits received by donors of the
winner candidate with the benefits received by non-donors. It is even more difficult to reach
clear conclusions with such comparison as donors might have characteristics that favors them
in a competitive tendering process like a better knowledge of the public sector.
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Result: Winners’ Donors Receive More Contracts
Table 1: Effect of donating to a winner on contracts assignment
Dependent variable: # Contracts ln(Value+1) # Min. Value contracts ln(Min. Value+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory 3.045** 0.239 1.803* 0.281**
(Conventional) (1.265) (0.203) (0.941) (0.131)
Victory 3.294** 0.209 2.009* 0.284*
(Robust) (1.499) (0.232) (1.152) (0.153)
Observations 1514 1182 1420 1256
Mean 0.931 0.346 0.462 0.182
Effect Mean(Per) 353.81 60.40 435.28 155.49
Bandwidth 0.126 0.088 0.115 0.098
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level and optimal bandwidth by
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Regressions at the municipality-candidate level.
Observations denote number of observations in bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
The first model in Table 1 shows that the donors of a winning candidate receive on
average 3.3 more contracts from the elected mayor than those received by the donors of
the runner up.18 This effect is statistically significant and represents a threefold increase in
the average number of contracts that donors of the two top candidates receive. The second
column shows the effect on the total value of the contracts received by donors. Although the
coefficient on electoral victory is positive, it is not significant. However, once we focus on
minimum value contracts in columns 3 and 4—the type of contracts that offer more room for
the mayor to reciprocate donors and less oversight— we see that the winner’s donors receive
more and larger contracts under the minimum value category than those who contributed
to the runner-up’s campaign. The value of all the minimum value contracts given to the
mayor’s donors is 28% larger than that of the contracts received by the donors of the mayor’s
18Below we show there is no significant effect of looser limits on the number of donors.
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closest rival.19
Effects of Looser Contribution Limits
The previous evidence is consistent with favoritism towards the election winner’s donors in
public procurement. We now evaluate if campaign limits can be effective at curbing the
influence of money in politics. We show that when campaign limits are looser, donations
increase on average and donors are more likely to receive government contracts.
A challenge we face when studying the effects of restrictions on campaign contribu-
tions on the value and number of donor-managed contracts is that these outcomes could
be explained by other municipality characteristics linked to campaign dynamics and regu-
lations. For example, larger municipalities—those with less restrictive limits—have larger
budgets, which could facilitate elected officials favoring donors. Larger municipalities also
have more dynamic and diversified economies, which again, can simultaneously increase the
number and value of contracts that the local government requires as well as the number of
people willing to donate to a campaign.
To address these challenges, we employ a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity
design that uses arbitrary campaign limits set by Colombian institutions. Our main explana-
tory variable takes the value of 1 if the municipality is at or over the 25,000 registered voters
and 0 if it is not. Therefore, moving from control to treatment implies that the municipality
has looser campaign contribution limits.20
19Appendix A shows that these results are robust to changes in the choice of bandwidth.
20We focus on the 25,000 cutoff because of two reasons. First, there are only 14 obser-
vations within 5000 registered voters of the other three cutoffs. This means that we are
statistically limited in making claims on these other thresholds. Second, the magnitude of
the difference in limits changes at each cutoff, which makes the interpretation of treatment
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The main identification assumption is that the assignment of the treatment is the only
change affecting contract assignment and donations that occurs at the threshold of 25,000
registered voters (de la Cuesta and Imai 2016). If there is no manipulation of the registered
voters around the campaign limit cut-off, and if there are no other determinants of the
outcomes that vary discontinuously at the cut-off, the RDD allows us to estimate the causal
effect of looser campaign limits in those municipalities with a number of registered voters
near 25,000. In order to account for the trade-off between efficiency and bias in the selection
of the bandwidth, we employ the optimal bandwidth, bias correction, and robust standard
errors proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).21 We also report conventional
estimates for all results.
We carry out a number of checks to test the validity of the research design. One
concern is that candidates or some donors might influence the count of registered voters to
manipulate the campaign contribution limit in their municipalities. Under such manipulation
the final count could be artificially inflated to allow some donors to give larger contributions
in municipalities whose number of registered voters is closely below the 25,000 threshold. To
test if this concern is important in practice, we carry out the discontinuity in density test
proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2019) and find no evidence of a higher concentration
of municipalities with registered voters right above the cutoff (see Figure A6 Appendix A).
In addition, we check if predetermined characteristics of municipalities such as popu-
lation, discretionary income, total number of contracts assigned by the mayors, and mayor’s
wages, are smooth at the cut-off. If we were to find significant discontinuous jumps on these
characteristics at the cut off, it would be difficult to interpret our baseline estimates as causal
effects. Reassuringly, as Appendix B Table A3 shows, we find no significant effect of looser
effects harder.
21Evidence by Hyytinen et al. (2017) shows that this type of bias correction produces RDD
results that are similar to experimental estimates.
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limits on these characteristics.
It is also the case that candidates running in municipalities with registered voters just
below the 25,000 cutoff are similar to those running in municipalities just above this cutoff
with respect to gender, race, age, ideological orientation, elected office experience, experience
running a political campaign, and history of sanctions.
Result: Looser Limits Increase Donations and the Number and
Value of Donor Managed Contracts
We first verify that the campaign contribution limits are affecting the levels of donations in
winning campaigns. If that was not the case, it would be hard to argue that the effects of
limits on public contracts reported below are a response to changes in donors’ behavior.
In our sample, 47.38% of donors who contribute at the tighter limit (to the left of the
25000 voters cutoff) do so to the winner’s campaign.22 Such donors might want to donate
more, but the limit is preventing them from doing so. This suggests that an increase in
the limit has the potential to raise the levels of donations received by the leading candidate.
Note that even if the tighter limit does not bind for some donors, competitive pressures could
push them to increase their donations if they expect others to raise contributions when limits
are loosened. This could happen, for example, if the most coveted contracts are going to the
more generous donors. Consistent with the expectation of larger donations brought about
by looser limits, Table 2 shows that a municipality with higher limits (close to the 25,000
registered voters) has an average contribution to the mayor’s campaign that is 116.7% larger
than one with tighter contribution restrictions.23
22This number is computed for a sample of municipalities that are within 5000 registered
voters to the left of the cut off that determines changes in limits. The 5000 is chosen as it is
close to the computed optimal bandwidth in the regressions that follow.
23The online Appendix A shows that results are robust to bandwidths ranging from half
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Table 2: Effect of a higher campaign contribution limit on average donations
Dependent variable: ln(Avg. Donation+1)
Higher limits 1.134***
(Conventional) (0.316)
Higher limits 1.167***
(Robust) (0.383)
Observations 78
Mean 0.716
Effect mean(Per) 143.37
Bandwidth 4570.223
Robust standard errors and optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cat-
taneo and Titiunik (2014). Regression at the municipality level.
Observations denote observations in bandwidth. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In addition to increasing the average donation to the election winner, looser limits
also increase the benefits received by the winning candidate’s donors via public contracts.
The first model of Table 3 indicates that a donor contributing to the mayor’s campaign in a
municipality with higher limits receives 3.4 more contracts than one who did so in a munic-
ipality with more restrictive limits. Model 2 shows that the size of the contracts received by
a donor in a higher limit municipality is also larger than that of a donor in a municipality
with lower limits, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Once we focus on the
contracts over which the mayor has more discretion, the minimum value contracts, we see
that coefficient on higher limits in both the number and size of the contracts models are
positive and more precisely estimated. A mayor’s donor receives 2.2 more minimum value
contracts and these contracts are 66% more valuable in looser limit municipalities.
to twice as large as the optimal bandwidth.
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Table 3: Effect of a higher campaign contribution limit on contracts assigned to donors
Dependent variable: # Contracts ln(Value+1) # Min. Value contracts ln(Min. Value+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher limit 3.091*** 0.819 2.030** 0.638**
(Conventional) (1.170) (0.531) (0.817) (0.284)
Higher limit 3.364** 0.793 2.253** 0.667*
(Robust) (1.342) (0.666) (0.994) (0.355)
Observations 457 366 366 341
Mean 0.280 0.205 0.210 0.101
Effect Mean(Per) 1201.43 386.83 1072.86 660.40
Bandwidth 6979.773 5312.321 5292.418 5190.197
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level and optimal bandwidth by Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Regressions at the donor level. Observations denote observations
in bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Mechanism: Looser Limits Increase the Influence of Top Donors
We have seen that donors of mayoral elections’ winners receive more benefits in the form of
public contracts where contribution limits are higher. We now show that this is a consequence
of higher contribution limits increasing the individual influence of the wealthiest donors over
elected officials.
We argue that wealthier donors have more influence over elected officials in higher
limit municipalities because they can contribute at a level that cannot be matched by other
more cash-constrained donors. By raising their contributions, the wealthier donors increase
their chances of getting a reward from an elected candidate. This is because a candidate
who receives a larger fraction of her campaign revenue from a donor feels more pressure to
reciprocate. Moreover, when a candidate who wants to reciprocate a donor faces a limited
budget, she is forced to prioritize the assignment of rewards to the more generous ones. While
in municipalities with low limits wealthier donors and other less wealthy donors donate at
more similar (lower) levels, with higher limits wealthier donors compete among each other
to obtain benefits from the mayor giving much more and increasing the weight of their
18
contributions in the winning candidate’s campaign revenues.
Figure 1: Donors’ contributions to campaigns across limits cut-off
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Averages are taken first across donors in each group (top-two or non top-two) and
then across municipalities. 95% confidence intervals.
If higher contribution limits increase the influence of the most generous donors over
the mayor in this way, we should see a larger difference between what the top and non-top
donors contribute to the mayor’s campaign in municipalities with looser limits. Figure 1
shows that this is the case. In looser limit municipalities, the average individual contribu-
tion among the top two donors as a fraction of total campaign resources is 19 percentage
points larger than the average contribution of a non-top donor. In low contribution limit
municipalities, on the other hand, this difference is only 8 percentage points.24
Table 4 gives consistent evidence using the RD estimation framework. As Columns
1 and 2 show, the effect of a higher contribution limit on the average contributions of a top
donor (as a fraction of total campaign revenues) is 12.4 percentage points, while the effect of
higher limits on the contribution of a non-top donor (as a fraction of total campaign revenues)
is a negative and statistically insignificant 0.2 percentage points. Columns 3 and 4 report
24For these figures, we have taken municipalities that are within 5000 registered voters of
the cut off that determines the change in contribution limits. This bandwidth is close to the
optimal one used in baseline RD estimates.
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the effects on the levels of donations. The top donors’ average contribution increases by a
124.3% with looser limits while the average non-top donors’ contribution remains constant.
For these results we have counted the two most generous donors as top donors. We
do this because the distribution of donations in the data show that the top two donors give
significantly more than the rest.25 The results, however, are similar to those reported here
if instead we compare what the most generous donor gives (as share of campaign revenues)
with donations from the rest of donors, or if we compare the average contribution of the top
3 with that of the rest (see Table A4 in Appendix B).
Table 4: Effect of a higher contribution limit on campaign revenues (top and non-top donors)
Dependent variable: Share Share ln(Avg. Donation+1) ln(Avg. Donation+1)
top non-top top non-top
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher limit 0.135** -0.001 1.190*** 0.009
(Conventional) (0.056) (0.011) (0.331) (0.131)
Higher limit 0.131* -0.002 1.243*** 0.002
(Robust) (0.068) (0.013) (0.397) (0.171)
Observations 133 79 76 69
Mean 0.091 0.012 0.824 0.24
Effect Mean(Per) 143.96 -16.67 150.85 0.83
Bandwidth 7106.457 4786.773 4527.716 4121.07
Robust standard errors and optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014). Regressions at the municipality level. Observations denote
observations in bandwidth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To further examine our proposed theoretical mechanism, we estimate heterogeneous
effects of higher limits on contracts received by top and non-top donors. If higher limits
increase the influence of top donors over the mayors, the effects of higher limits on the
contracts they receive should be stronger for them than for donors that contribute a smaller
share of total donations. Importantly, since top donors and non-top donors might differ in
characteristics that affect their ability to receive contracts, the interaction term between a
25See Figure A7 in Appendix.
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top donor indicator and the higher limit treatment might be endogenous at the cutoff in our
regressions. To account for this source of bias, we take a selection on observables approach
as proposed by Gerardino, Litschig and Pomeranz (2017) in which we use propensity scores
to give more weight in the estimation to observations where top donors and non top donors
are similar in terms of observed characteristics.26 The results are presented in Table A6 in
Appendix B. As expected, the results show that the effect of higher limits on the value of all
contracts and the number and value of minimum value contracts for top donors is positive
and significantly larger than the effect of higher limits on the number and size of non-top
donors’ contracts.
There are alternative explanations for the increased rewards to donors via contracts
in municipalities with less restrictive limits that do not rely on changes in the distribution
of donations. It is possible that larger rewards to donors in looser limit municipalities may
be the consequence of changes in the nature of the electoral competition (Stratmann, J and
Aparicio-Castillo 2006; Hall 2016; Fouirnaies 2018). For example, campaigns where there
is more money might attract different types of candidates who could be more willing to
reciprocate their donors. It could also be that campaigns where contribution limits are
higher might exhibit less electoral competition, which could reduce accountability pressures
on the elected candidate. To assess whether these explanations account for the observed
patterns, we estimate the effects of higher limits on characteristics of the pool of candidates,
the winning candidate, and measures of electoral competition.
Table A7 in the Appendix B presents the effects of having looser limits on character-
26These are: the type of economic activities they engage, whether they are business own-
ers, and the age of their business operations, which are available for donors registered in
the chamber of commerce. There are no significant discontinuities around the cut off for
those characteristics, nor for being registered in the chamber of commerce (see Table A5 in
Appendix B). We use the optimal bandwidth from the full sample baseline results.
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istics of the mayor. Elected mayors in higher limit municipalities are no different in terms of
age, gender, ideology, experience in elected office or participating in elections, or record of
sanctions than those in lower limit municipalities. The only difference we find is that they
are less likely to belong to an indigenous ethnic group.27 Overall, this evidence is inconsistent
with lower quality candidates being elected in campaigns with more donor money.
Similarly, Table A8 shows that electoral competition in treatment and control munic-
ipalities is similar. We see this in terms of the margin of victory, the number of candidates,
the demographic composition of the candidates, the share of candidates who participated in
previous elections and those who have previously been elected. The effect of higher limits
on the vote share of the winner is marginally significant at the 10% level but it is negative.
This is inconsistent with the reduced electoral competition argument that highlights how a
lack of electoral accountability brought about by reduced competition encourages donors’
rewards. One could also argue that given that higher limits appear to decrease the winner’s
vote share, candidates in a more competitive environment might have to compete for the
wealthier donors by offering them greater future rewards. We examine this possibility by
studying the impact of higher limits on the concentration of large donors among candidates,
finding no significant differences on both sides of the cut off.28
27Having confirmed that there are no systematic differences in proxies for propensity of
malfeasance, demographics, and ideology, it is not clear how belonging to an indigenous
ethnic group would impact our outcomes of interest or treatment. When we estimate the
effect of higher limits on donors’ benefits controlling for indigenous ethnicity we still find a
positive effect of higher limits of similar magnitudes as those reported on the number of all
contracts and the number of minimum value contracts. Results for the value of minimum
value contracts is positive and of a similar magnitude, but it is not precisely estimated.
28Results are reported in Table A8 in Appendix B. For this test we use as explanatory
variables the Herfindhal of large donors computed with the shares of large donors that each
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Robustness: Under-reporting in Donations Data
A concern with some of our findings is that campaigns might under-report their contributions
in municipalities with lower limits. This would tend to bias our results in favor of finding
a positive effect of looser limits on donations and, if campaigns do not report some donors,
it could overstate the additional benefits going to donors in looser limit municipalities. We
first note that electronic campaign finance reporting became mandatory in 2009 and that the
first local elections to fully implement the measure were those of 2011–the election for which
we have data. The reporting system was jointly designed by Transparency International
and the electoral commission to increase transparency in campaign reporting and fines for
violators of the norm were introduced.29 This could have increased expectations of higher
scrutiny in the documents presented by campaigns.
Nevertheless, we conduct a number of checks to assess whether measurement error
is affecting our findings. We first examine the patterns of missing information in the dona-
tions data on both sides of the discontinuity cutoff. If donors not only reduce the reported
amounts of contributions but also decide not to report at all more frequently when there are
lower limits, we should see more missing information in the donation data to the left of the
discontinuity. Appendix B Table A9 shows a statistically insignificant coefficient on higher
limits in a model of reporting. A problem with this test in our data, however, is that no
winning campaign has missing reports. To address this, we additionally estimate a model
where we restrict the sample to include only campaigns of second place candidates in close
elections which, given our previous results, are similar to those of election winners.30 We
candidate has. Large donors are defined as those whose donations are above the median in
the municipality. Results are robust to using the 75th percentile in this definition.
29The fines were eliminated in future elections. See Norm 1044 of 2011 article 4 and Norm
3109 of 2012.
30We include in the sample municipalities for which the margin of victory was less than
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still do not find a significant effect of higher limits on reporting.
As a second test we estimate the effect of looser limits on the number of donors of
the winning candidate. If we observe a significant increase in the number of donors in higher
limit municipalities, this could be partially explained by campaigns not reporting some of
their donors in lower limit municipalities. This would imply an under count of donors who
are receiving contracts to the left of the cut off which leads to a bias in favor of finding
larger benefits to donors with looser limits. The results of this test, however, show that
there are no significant differences in the number of donors on both sides of the threshold
that determines the change in contribution limits (see Table A3 in Appendix B).
The results of this test are also inconsistent with an alternative interpretation re-
garding the increase in top donors’ contributions brought by looser limits as seen in Figure
1. Under such interpretation, top donors could be violating the more restrictive limits by
donating through third parties whose individual (smaller) donations comply with the reg-
ulations. Once limits are loosened, they no longer would have to use indirect donations,
which would explain the rise in their individual influence as measured by the share of their
contributions in total campaign revenues. If this was true, however, one would expect to see
a negative effect of looser limits on the number of donors, which we do not find.
In a third test to examine the issue of underreporting we study the effect of higher
limits on all contracts in economic areas and under contractual categories that are typically
received by donors, a variable that is not affected by campaign information misreporting.
In our data 32% of the contracts that are given to donors are associated with purchases
of construction machinery and office supplies. If public contracts were not influenced by
campaign donations and our baseline findings are driven just by measurement error, it would
be hard to explain a positive effect of looser limits on contracts (managed by donors and non-
donors) in the economic areas and in contracting categories where donors typically receive
10 percentage points, which was the optimal bandwidth used in the results of Table 1.
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contracts. Table A10 in online Appendix B shows that the share of total minimum value
contracts associated to office supplies is 7.3 percentage points higher in municipalities with
looser limits. The effect of looser limits on the share of contracts associated to purchases of
machinery is 5 percentage points. These are large effects considering that 16.6% and 9.6%
of all contracts are minimum value contracts associated to office supplies and machinery
respectively.
Result: The Quality of Contracts Worsen and Other Implications
So far we have established that looser campaign limits concentrate donor power among top
donors while also increasing the kickbacks they receive in terms of government contracts. In
this section we explore how these changes can affect the general public.
We first address the question of whether there are negative consequences on the per-
formance of public contracts received by donors. It could be the case that looser limits
increase contract efficiency, as greater campaign spending allows voters to select the can-
didates who know best how to allocate public resources. The results in Table 5 suggest
that this is unlikely. Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of higher campaign limits on the
probability that a contract requires a time extension and that it ran over stipulated costs.
We find that contracts assigned to donors in municipalities with higher limits are 7.1 per-
centage points more likely to require a time extension, though this result is statistically not
distinguishable from zero. However, these contracts are 7.4 percentage points more likely to
run over stipulated costs. Moreover, the value of the additional costs of contracts assigned
to donors is 92.3% higher in these same municipalities. When we examine minimum value
contracts, we see that the probability of receiving time extensions and of presenting over
cost is higher in looser limit municipalities. The number of additional days is also also more
than 15% higher.31
31Minimum value results use a fixed bandwidth of 3000 registered voters. This is because
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We also explore whether looser limits are overall good for the donors themselves.
While we have shown that donors are benefited via more numerous and larger contracts,
it is possible the looser limits might still not make donors better off as the price they pay
for such benefits (represented by their donations) increases as well. Table A11 in Appendix
B presents the effect of looser limits on the ratio of the value of all contracts that a donor
receives to the value of her contribution, the profitability ratio. We find that looser limits
increase the profitability ratio of minimum value contracts by 85.3 percent. The effect is
even larger (155 percent) but only significant at the 10% level when we count all types of
contracts. Consistent with our proposed theoretical mechanism, Table A12 in Appendix A
shows that these effects are driven by the top donors. Overall, this and previous results
indicate that when campaign contribution limits are not restrictive, well-off individuals are
obtaining a larger net economic benefit at the expense of the general population.
An alternative channel by which changes in campaign contribution limits might affect
the public is through their potential impact on the quality of elections. If candidates are
restricted on the resources they can receive and spend legally, does this push them towards
engaging in illegal activities to win elections? This question is relevant in developing democ-
racies where electoral manipulation and the involvement of armed groups in the electoral
process is common. In Colombia, in particular, right wing paramilitaries tried to influence
the outcomes of local and national elections around this period (Acemoglu, Robinson and
Santos 2013). Table A13 in Appendix B shows that there are no significant differences in
vote and turnout suppression reports, armed groups’ attacks, nor paramilitaries’ attacks at
both sides of the cutoff. This also indicates that there is no strong evidence in favor of more
money in campaigns financing vote buying.
there are not enough minimum value contracts that present variation in cost overruns and
extensions for narrower margins. Results are robust for margins of 4000 registered voters.
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Conclusions
We examine if campaign contribution limits curb benefits for donors through the assignment
of public contracts in Colombia. We first document a strong bias in public procurement
assignment in favor of donors of the winning candidate. We also find that these donors receive
a greater number of and extract more value from public contracts in municipalities with looser
campaign contribution limits. The evidence presented here suggests that larger benefits
given to donors in higher limit municipalities are explained by wealthier donors having a
greater influence over the mayor and not by candidate selection effects nor changes in the
competitiveness of the election. The contracts given to donors in higher limit municipalities
also tend to perform worse, requiring more time to be completed and running over costs.
Overall in the absence of tight contribution limits, society pays more and has to
wait longer for the completion of public projects, while wealthier campaign donors are more
than compensated by receiving public contracts. Under a higher contribution limits regime
economic inequalities are widened, as those who are able to contribute more, obtain larger
economic benefits.
With these findings we contribute to the debate on the efficacy of campaign finance
reforms that restrict the flow of private interests’ money in elections. This paper has con-
centrated on one potential benefit of reducing the influence of donors over elected officials:
reducing the biased allocation of public resources. Future work should explore whether cam-
paign contribution limits impose costs on society by altering the flow of information available
to voters. The fact that we do not find more experienced candidates with fewer sanctions
running as candidates and being elected in higher contribution limit municipalities, however,
is inconsistent with strong informational gains by the public.
It is also important to note that campaign finance reforms’ effects might change over
time. As long as governments offer contracts that generate higher profits than those of the
28
private sector—as is common with local government contracts in developing democracies—
private interests will have strong incentives to continue influencing elections through dona-
tions or through other means. While the effect of contribution limits on donors’ influence over
elected officials could be diminishing over time as moneyed interest find ways to circumvent
formal rules, the effects of fewer restrictions on contributions on voters’ information might
be more persistent. More research is also needed to study how campaign finance reforms
alter the different ways private interests try to influence politics.
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A Other Figures
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Figure A1: Effect of electoral victory on donors’ contracts (left-number, right-logged value)
0
2
4
6
8
P
oi
nt
 E
st
im
at
e
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Vote Share Win
-.5
0
.5
1
P
oi
nt
 E
st
im
at
e
.04 .06 .08 .1 .12 .14 .16 .18
Vote Share Win
Bias corrected estimates and 95% robust confidence intervals. Red line indicates optimal
bandwidth.
Figure A2: Effect of electoral victory on donors’ minimum value contracts (left-number,
right-logged value)
-2
0
2
4
6
P
oi
nt
 E
st
im
at
e
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Vote Share Win
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
P
oi
nt
 E
st
im
at
e
.04 .06 .08 .1 .12 .14 .16 .18 .2
Vote Share Win
Bias corrected estimates and 95% robust confidence intervals. Red line indicates optimal
bandwidth.
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Figure A3: Effect of higher limits on mean donations
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Bias corrected estimates and 95% robust confidence intervals. Red line indicates optimal
bandwidth.
Figure A4: Effect of higher limits on donors’ contracts (left-number, right-logged value)
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Bias corrected estimates and 95% robust confidence intervals. Red line indicates optimal
bandwidth.
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Figure A5: Effect of higher limits on donors’ Minimum Value contracts (left-number, right-
logged value)
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Bias corrected estimates and 95% robust confidence intervals. Red line indicates optimal
bandwidth.
Figure A6: Distribution of municipalities across registered voters (manipulation of running
variable test)
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The figure shows the density of the running variable. The test of no discontinuity at the
cutoff (Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma 2019) has a statistic of −0.128 and a p-value of 0.98).
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Figure A7: Donors’ contributions to campaigns
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Bars are ordered from the top donor on the left to the fifth most gen-
erous donor on the right. Sample includes municipalities within 5,000
registered voters at both sides of the 25,000 cut-off.
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B Other Tables
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Table A1: Smooth individual covariates around the electoral victory cut-off
Mean Std. Dev. Victory Std. Error. Obs. Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:Individual characteristics
Women 0.116 0.320 0.033 0.051 944 0.067 0.519
Age 45.226 9.712 0.39 1.547 1009 0.079 0.801
Black 0.044 0.206 0.023 0.03 959 0.074 0.457
Indigenous 0.109 0.311 -0.039 0.05 1000 0.078 0.432
Leftist party 0.025 0.156 -0.022 0.029 1192 0.09 0.438
Right-wing 0.244 0.429 -0.08 0.06 1050 0.075 0.188
Previously sanctioned 0.123 0.328 -0.075 0.049 1116 0.08 0.124
Illegal Registration of ID. 0.005 0.073 -0.003 0.013 1120 0.081 0.815
Has political experience 0.450 0.498 0.063 0.064 1354 0.109 0.325
Held office before 0.364 0.481 -0.01 0.066 1192 0.091 0.885
Panel B: Funding covariates
Number of Donors 4.151 6.725 0.811 0.901 1170 0.087 0.368
Total Campaign Income 46.655 99.311 14.381 12.512 1180 0.087 0.25
Donor revenue/total revenue 0.176 0.272 -0.031 0.036 1422 0.115 0.389
Columns 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the
effect of electoral victory on each variable, using Calonico et al. (2014)’s optimal bandwidths
(reported in column 6), bias correction, and robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level (column 4), with local linear regression and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the
number of observations including in each estimation.
vii
Table A2: Smooth characteristics of donors around the electoral victory cut-off
Mean Std. Dev. Victory Std. Error. Obs. Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chamber of Commerce 0.420 0.494 0.034 0.082 1883 0.058 0.678
Company 0.262 0.440 -0.079 0.140 859 0.064 0.572
Producer as main activity 0.098 0.297 -0.059 0.058 647 0.050 0.308
Age of company (Months) 165.205 171.317 -34.536 24.168 467 0.045 0.153
Columns 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of the
effect of electoral on each variable, using Calonico et al. (2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported
in column 6), bias correction, and robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
(column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number
of observations including in each estimation.
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Table A4: Robustness: Effect of a higher contribution limit on campaign revenues (top and
non-top donors)
Dependent variable: Share Share Share Share
top3 non-top3 top1 non-top1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher limit 0.106** -0.005 0.198** 0.024
(Conventional) (0.052) (0.007) (0.077) (0.029)
Higher limit 0.096 -0.007 0.205** 0.026
(Robust) (0.062) (0.008) (0.091) (0.037)
Observations 123 78 195 261
Mean 0.086 0.007 0.104 0.028
Effect Mean(Per) 111.63 -100.00 197.12 92.86
Bandwidth 6673.098 4664.657 9615.509 11621.432
Robust standard errors and optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cat-
taneo and Titiunik (2014). Regressions at the municipality level.
Observations denote observations in bandwidth. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A9: Effect of higher limits on campaign finance reporting of runner up candidate
Sample: All elections Close elections
Higher limits -0.119 0.072
(Conventional) (0.107) (0.085)
Higher limits -0.151 0.0802
(Robust) (0.118) (0.112)
Observations 178 133
Mean 0.923 0.923
Effect mean(Per) -16.348 7.8
Bandwidth 9028.990 10091
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, bias cor-
rected estimates and the optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo
and Titiunik (2014). Regression at the municipality level.
xv
Table A10: Effect of higher contribution limits on share of contracts typically received by
donors
Dependent variable: Min. Val. Materials Min Val. Supplies
(1) (2)
Higher limit 0.041* 0.059*
(Conventional) (0.023) (0.035)
Higher limit 0.050* 0.073*
(Robust) (0.027) (0.041)
Observations 77 75
Mean 0.096 0.166
Effect Mean(Per) 52.08 43.98
Bandwidth 4510.587 4432.108
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors and opti-
mal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Local
linear regression used to construct point estimator. Regressions at
the municipality level.
Table A11: Effect of higher contribution limits on profitability
Multiplier Log Multiplier Min. Val Multiplier Log(Min. Val Multiplier)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Looser limit 76.605 1.457** 36.416* 0.792***
(Conventional) (60.555) (0.682) (19.431) (0.294)
Looser limit 65.548 1.551* 38.979 0.853**
(Robust) (74.758) (0.849) (23.848) (0.375)
Observations 249 301 291 278
Mean 308.831 0.299 4.002 0.116
Effect Mean(Per) 21.22 518.73 973.99 735.34
Bandwidth 3769.484 4860.994 4596.197 4498.597
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
and optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Regressions at the donor
level. Observations denote observations in bandwidth.
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Table A12: Effect of looser limits on profitability by groups of donors (top vs. non-top)
Profitability Log(Profitability+1) Min. Val Profitability Log(Min. Val Profitability +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-top -353.232 -2.318 -39.743 -1.852
(505.095) (1.375) (38.405) (1.066)
Top 2 127.759 3.834 70.876* 2.563
(94.930) (2.004) (37.060) (1.445)
Difference 480.990 6.153*** 110.619** 4.415**
(511.261) (2.351) (51.975) (1.754)
Observations 42 57 52 50
Bandwidth 3769.484 4860.994 4596.197 4498.597
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Profitability denotes the ratio of value of contracts to
donation. Clustered bootstrap standard errors with 500 replications. Optimal bandwidth by
optimal bandwidth by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Variables used for propensity
score: company is registered with the chamber of commerce, registered as a company, producer
as main activity, age of the company (in months)..
Table A13: Effect of higher contribution limits on electoral manipulation
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Higher limits Std. Error. Obs. Bandwidth P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Vote buying reports 0.359 1.252 -0.509 0.449 65 3915.382 0.257
Turnout suppression 0.170 1.542 0.004 0.271 109 6277.308 0.989
Total Attacks 0.616 2.814 0.626 0.898 159 8351.977 0.486
Paramilitary Attacks 0.194 1.535 -0.313 0.267 89 5159.707 0.241
Columns 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics. Column 3 reports RDD point estimates of
the effect of higher campaign limits on each variable, using Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014)’s optimal bandwidths (reported in column 6), bias correction, and robust standard errors
(column 4), with linear local polynomials and triangular kernels. Column 5 reports the number
of observations including in each estimation. (*) Discretionary income scaled in # of minimum
monthly wages.
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